The Right to Privacy and Access to Abortion in a Post Puttaswamy World by Magill, Severyna
The Right to Privacy and Access to Abortion in a Post 
Puttaswamy World
MAGILL, Severyna
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/26788/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
MAGILL, Severyna (2020). The Right to Privacy and Access to Abortion in a Post 
Puttaswamy World. University of Oxford Human Rights Hub Journal, 3 (2), 160-194. 
Copyright and re-use policy
See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
The Right to Privacy and 
Access to Abortion in a Post-
Puttaswamy World 
Severyna Magill* 
Abstract 
 
In August 2017 India’s Supreme Court ruled that a Constitutional right 
to privacy exists in KS Puttaswamy v Union of India. Whilst considering 
how the right to privacy has evolved the Supreme Court referenced 
international case law charting the right to use contraception and to 
access abortion. Indian jurisprudence already has a wealth of case law on 
reproductive rights, often referencing the same principles of liberty, 
autonomy, and dignity that the Puttaswamy judgment refers to. After 
Puttaswamy there has been much talk about the scope of reproductive 
rights in India being broadened. This article contributes and builds upon 
this discourse as it seeks to predict how the Supreme Court will respond 
to future challenges using the new constitutional right to privacy. It maps 
the legal framework under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 
which regulates access to abortion within India and considers issues 
relating to access to abortion, the continuing practise of sex-
determination and sex-preferred abortions, and debates surrounding 
access to abortion where foetuses have been diagnosed with medical 
conditions likely to affect their quality of life, and/or survival. This article 
examines liberty, autonomy, and dignity as they are articulated within the 
Puttaswamy decision and how they are represented within existing 
reproductive rights jurisprudence and academic debates with reference to 
access to abortion. This approach aims to predict how any future 
challenge to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act’s provisions 
using the new constitutional right to privacy will be responded to by the 
Supreme Court of India.  
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1. Introduction 
In 2012, a retired Karnataka High Court judge, Justice KS Puttaswamy, 
became a key litigant challenging the government’s introduction of a 
unique identification number scheme, known commonly as Aadhaar, 
across India. The unique identification number was based on individuals’ 
biometric data and obtaining it gradually became a mandatory 
requirement in accessing public utilities and filing tax returns. Justice 
Puttaswamy’s writ petition before the Supreme Court of India claimed 
that Aadhaar was an intrusion on the right to privacy.
1
 As there was no 
right to privacy in the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court first 
had to establish the constitutional status of privacy. Justice Puttaswamy’s 
petition, together with twenty others, thus came to be decided first as a 
right to privacy claim, decided by a landmark nine-judge bench in 
Puttaswamy v Union of India.2 
In the unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of India declared 
privacy to be a constitutionally protected right. It held that: ‘[t]he right to 
privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal 
liberty under Article 21’ of the Constitution of India. The right was 
deemed to include ‘at its core the preservation of personal intimacies’ 
including, but not limited to, ‘procreation’ and the ‘right to be left alone.’3 
The relevance and applicability of this decision to reproductive rights is 
clear. The exercise of a person’s reproductive rights, including the right 
to access abortion, may now be said to be firmly grounded in the right to 
privacy, in turn, as the Supreme Court held in Puttaswamy, rooted in the 
values of liberty, autonomy, and dignity.
4
 The Puttaswamy judgment 
                                                        
1
 Akshatha Machina, ‘Aadhaar petitioner Justice KS Puttaswamy hails verdict’ The 
Economic Times (New Delhi, 27 September 2010) 
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/aadhaar-petitioner-justice-
ks-puttaswamy-hails-verdict/articleshow/65975395.cms> accessed 1 October 2019. 
2
 KS Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC. 
3
 ibid Plurality Judgment, [3(f)] 263. 
4
 The author chooses to use the term ‘pregnant person’ in recognition of non-gender 
binary persons, including trans-men’s ability to conceive and become pregnant. This is 
appropriate given the Supreme Court of India’s recognition of transgender rights in 
National Legal Services Authority v Union of India And Others (2014) 5 SCC 438. She 
also uses the terms ‘they’ and ‘their’ as gender-neutral, singular pronouns throughout. As 
 cannot be read as a complete exploration of reproductive rights in India 
given the specific legal question it considered. However, the right to 
privacy, as declared in Puttaswamy, disrupts the constitutional basis of 
the current legal framework surrounding abortion, and reproductive 
rights more broadly, in India. While the Medical Termination of 
Pregnancy Act 1971(MTPA) decriminalises access to abortion in limited 
circumstances, there is no legal right to abortion on demand. The 
creation of a constitutional right to privacy therefore potentially creates a 
privacy-based justification for a freestanding right to abortion.  
The article explores such consistencies and inconsistencies between 
the privacy infused reading of reproductive rights in Puttaswamy, and 
pre-existing reproductive rights jurisprudence in India. In particular, the 
aim is to illustrate how the new constitutional right to privacy may shape 
future challenges to the MTPA and to consider how the right to 
reproductive health needs to evolve to align with the substantive basis of 
Puttaswamy. This article begins by mapping  the legal framework 
regulating access to abortion in India. It then explores three principles of 
privacy: liberty, autonomy, and dignity, that emerged in Puttaswamy and 
applies them to three challenging areas of reproductive rights in India 
today: (i) access to abortion and the availability of health-infrastructure; 
(ii) the continuing practice of sex-determination and sex-preferred 
abortions; and (iii) debates surrounding access to abortion where foetuses 
have been diagnosed with medical conditions likely to affect their quality 
of life, and/or survival.  
Section 1 agrees with Justice Chandrachud’s assertion in the plurality 
opinion that without an individual’s ability to exercise choices the 
inviolability of the human personality, and the right to liberty are in 
doubt.
5
 The section highlights the barriers women across India may 
encounter when trying to access reproductive healthcare due to 
economic, geographic, and social reasons. It questions how meaningful a 
right to liberty to make free choices is, if there is limited healthcare 
infrastructure that prevents the realisation of legal rights. It recommends 
adopting Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to more effectively 
question what resources and opportunities exist, and which need to be 
improved, for women to meaningfully be able to exercise their rights to 
privacy, liberty, and reproductive health. This approach highlights the 
weaknesses in the availability of health infrastructure and suggests a 
framework to structure the government’s obligations to fulfil 
constitutional and human rights duties.  
                                                                                                               
the petitioners in all of the cases referred to identified as women the author uses the terms 
pregnant person, they, their, and woman/women interchangeably. 
5
 Puttaswamy (n 2) [168] 242-243.  
Section 2 examines how the right to privacy, and specifically 
autonomy as it is defined in Puttaswamy, may be used to seek legal 
sanction for the practice of sex-determination and sex-preferred 
abortions in India. The right to autonomy, at its core, supports the right 
of individuals to exercise choice free from interference by the State. An 
examination of existing jurisprudence challenging the validity of 
restrictions on sex-determination demonstrates how Indian courts have 
found co-existing constitutional and public policy interests that 
outweighed the rights petitioners used in seeking sex-determination. 
Applying the reasoning of the existing jurisprudence, this article argues 
that it is unlikely that any challenge to restrictions on sex-determination 
using the new constitutional right to privacy would be successful. 
Within India, the MTPA’s provisions currently allow the termination 
of a foetus with a diagnosed impairment up to twenty weeks into the 
pregnancy. Section 3 examines how dignity was referred to in the 
Puttaswamy decision and within existing reproductive rights 
jurisprudence within India. It also identifies the use of dignity both by 
anti-choice as well as disability rights activists, to ascribe rights to foetuses. 
It presents the similarities Kavana Ramaswamy identifies between 
commonly accepted justifications for terminating foetuses likely to be 
born disabled in the US, with reasons used to support the termination of 
female foetuses in India. It argues that while the disability rights discourse 
is still emerging in India, the concept of dignity, and to whom it is 
ascribed, is currently inconsistently applied within existing Indian 
jurisprudence. If a petition using the constitutional right to privacy goes 
to court seeking to broaden the MTPA’s twenty week limit this article 
suggests it is likely this will be accepted but as disability rights arguments 
are continually developing this is uncertain. 
Throughout this article the term reproductive rights will be used to 
refer to reproductive health rights, and specifically access to abortion. 
The UN’s International Conference on Population and Development 
(1994) (ICPD) defined reproductive health as ‘a state of complete 
physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and 
to its functions and processes’.6 Whilst the ICPD was foundational in 
declaring that women and girls have rights to sexual and reproductive 
health, it stopped short of recognising a right to abortion. Since then the 
UN’s Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its 2016 
                                                        
6
 UN International Conference on Population and Development (1994) [7.2] 
<www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-
pdf/programme_of_action_Web%20ENGLISH.pdf> accessed 15 May 2019. See Rebecca 
Cook and Bernard Dickens, ‘From Reproductive Choice to Reproductive Justice’ (2009) 
106 International Journal of Gynaecology and Obstetrics 106. 
 General Comment on the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health, has 
explicitly recognised the right to abortion as a human right.
7
 The right to 
reproductive health may therefore be understood to include access to the 
‘foundational’ determinants of healthcare infrastructure to prevent and 
treat medical conditions.
8
 This includes upholding wellbeing, such as 
access to family planning education, contraception, and abortion. In 
2010, Lance Gable defined rights to ‘privacy, liberty, equality, autonomy 
and dignity’ as ‘decisional’ reproductive rights.9 Gable argued these rights 
enable individuals, primarily in the West, to exercise autonomous 
decisions over their reproductive functioning. Recent jurisprudence 
could add freedom from cruel or degrading treatment to this list.
10
 When 
the right to health is blended with reproductive rights, Gable argues that 
the right to reproductive health rights is created.
11
 It is this confluence of 
health with reproductive rights that forms the basis of the present 
discussion.  
2. The Legal Framework Regulating Access to 
Abortion in India  
‘Causing miscarriage’ (abortion) is criminalised under sections 312-16 of 
the Indian Penal Code 1860 (IPC). The IPC, a hangover of the British 
colonial rule, criminalises both causing abortions and accessing them.
12
  A 
woman who ‘causes herself to miscarry’ is caught within these 
provisions.
13
 There are different consequences of breach depending on 
the number of weeks of gestation.
14
 This restrictive law forced many 
women to access illegal abortion services that were unregulated, 
unhygienic, and unsafe. As a direct consequence of the IPC’s restrictive 
provisions, the maternal mortality and morbidity rate was extremely 
                                                        
7
 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No 22 on 
the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health’ (2016) E/C.12/GC/22 [13], [18], [21], [28].  
8
 Lance Gable, ‘Reproductive Health as a Human Right’ (2009-2010) 60(4) Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law 957, 969. 
9
 ibid 969. 
10
 VC v Slovakia, (2014) 59 EHRR 29 (European Court of Human Rights); Mellet v 
Ireland (2016) CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 (UN Human Rights Committee). 
11
 Gable (n 8) 970. 
12
 The IPC’s provisions regulating abortion, enacted in 1860, closely resemble the UK’s 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861. 
13
 Explanation to Section 312 of Indian Penal Code.  
14
 Section 312 of Indian Penal Code. 
high.
15
 In response, the Government of India constituted a committee to 
review the law relating to abortion in the 1960s.  
The Report of the Committee to Study the Question of Legalisation 
of Abortion (1966), also referred to as the Shantilal Shah Committee 
Report, recommended the decriminalisation of abortion in specific 
compassionate circumstances.
16
 The MTPA was subsequently enacted in 
1971 in line with the Report’s recommendations. The MTPA does not 
introduce a right to abortion, which would have provided rights-holders 
access to abortion on demand. Instead, the MTPA’s public health 
origins, to prevent the ‘avoidable wastage of the mother’s health, strength 
and, sometimes life’,17 focus on enabling access to legal and regulated 
abortion services within government hospitals and decriminalises 
abortion in certain circumstances. It is useful to consider its provisions in 
some detail. To comply with the MTPA’s provisions, abortions may only 
be performed in some circumstances and must be performed by 
registered medical practitioners. Further, they must be performed in 
hospitals/places established/maintained/approved by the government or 
district level committees.
18
 Section 3 of the MTPA allows abortion, up to 
twenty weeks of gestation, if ‘there is a substantial risk that if the child 
were born, it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as 
to be seriously handicapped’19 or if ‘the continuance of the pregnancy 
would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury 
to her physical or mental health’. If a pregnancy is caused by rape or a 
failure of contraception, then it is presumed that the continuation of 
pregnancy could constitute grave injury to a woman’s mental health.20 
A woman’s ‘actual or reasonably foreseeable environment’21 may also 
be considered when considering the potential injury caused to a woman 
if the pregnancy is not terminated. This has been interpreted, though not 
consistently, to include the existing care responsibilities a woman may 
have, and her socio-economic position. Section 5 of the MTPA states 
that the length of the pregnancy does not apply when an abortion is 
‘immediately necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.’ Life 
here, as in similar legislation across the world, has not been defined and 
                                                        
15
 World Health Organisation ‘Health Statistics and Information Systems’  
<www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/indmaternalmortality/en/> accessed 5 July 2019.   
16
 Amar Jesani, Aditi Iyer, ‘Abortion – Who is Responsible for Our Rights?’ (CEHAT, 
August 1995) 7 <www.cehat.org/go/uploads/Publications/A%2040.pdf> accessed 20 August 
2019, Siddhi Hirve, ‘Policy and Practice’ (India Seminar, undated) <www.india-
seminar.com/2003/532/532%20siddhi%20hirve.htm> accessed 20 August 2019. 
17
 Statement of Objects and Reasons of MTPA. 
18
 Sections 3 and 4 of MTPA. 
19
 Section 3(2)(ii) of MTPA. 
20
 Section 3 (2), Explanation I and II of MTPA. 
21
 Section 3 (3) of MTPA. 
 is open to judicial interpretation.
22
 In all cases the consent of the pregnant 
person is required, and in the cases of minors or a ‘mentally ill person’,23 
the consent of their guardian is also required.
24
 
Whilst the MTPA is often praised for being liberal, especially 
considering how long ago it was drafted, it is not immune from criticism. 
Health activists and feminists have consistently highlighted the 
government’s failure to prioritise access to contraception to prevent 
unplanned pregnancies, something that has been promoted since the 
Shantilal Shah Committee Report first recommended it in 1966.
25
 The 
2002 Amendment to the MTPA included use of medical abortion 
medication as a legal form of abortion. Despite this its use in government 
hospitals is significantly lower than its use in private facilities, thus 
creating inequality in access.
26
 Since the Amendment, abortion 
medication has become widely available informally, with sales increasing 
by 646 percent between 2002-2007.
27
 The broad use of the medication 
informally, suggests low levels of formal access nationally or its use 
beyond the Act’s provisions. Easy informal access to abortion medication 
results in it being taken without medical guidance.
28
 This has resulted in 
some medical practitioners experiencing a high number of cases of 
incomplete abortion, usually when the medication has been taken 
                                                        
22
 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1.  
23
 Section 2(i) of The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 2002. 
24
 Section 3(4) of MTPA. 
25
 Susheela Singh et al, ‘The Incidence of Abortion and Unintended Pregnancy in India, 
2015’ (2018) 6 Lancet Global Health e111, e111-112; Meena Armo et al, ‘Maternal 
Morbidity Due to Unsafe Medical Abortion in Rural Practice Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg: 
Is It Really Preventable?’ (2015) 4(1) International Journal of Reproduction, 
Contraception, Obstetrics and Gynaecology 56; Ravi Duggal and Vimala Ramachandran, 
‘The Abortion Assessment Project—India: Key Findings and Recommendations’ 2004 12 
(24 Supplement) Reproductive Health Matters 122, 122-3, 126. 
26
 Singh et al (n 25) 116; Pritam Potdar et al, ‘“If a Woman Has Even One Daughter, I 
Refuse to Perform the Abortion”: Sex Determiantion and Safe Abortion in India’ (2015) 
23(45) Reproductive Health Matters 114. 
27
 Beverly Winikoff and Wendy Sheldon, ‘Use of Medicines Changing the Face of 
Abortion’ (2012) 38(3) International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, 164, 
164.  
28
 “[A]nnual sales of these abortion pills is estimated at 1,10,00,000 doses while the 
number of reported medical abortions is just 7,00,000”; Sarita Barpanda et al, ‘My Body 
My Choice—A Human Rights Perspective of Abortion Law in India’ (Human Rights Law 
Network, 5 July 2019) 15 <http://reproductiverights.hrln.org/my-body-my-choice-a-human-
rights-perspective-of-abortion-law-in-india/> accessed 10 July 2019. 
beyond the recommended gestational limit,
29
 resulting in some doctors 
calling for a ban on its sale.
30
  
Another important development in the 2002 Amendment concerned 
the replacement of the term ‘lunatic’ with the term ‘mentally ill person’.31 
Yet, the Amendment did not consider a person’s capacity to consent and 
this has caused delays in accessing abortion.
32
 It also failed to replace the 
outdated language which allows failure of contraception between a 
married couple to be a ground for abortion, thus leaving non-married 
pregnant persons vulnerable to being excluded.
33
 Lastly, it did not extend 
the twenty week gestational limit to allow abortions if foetal conditions 
that affect quality of life/survival are diagnosed beyond the twenty week 
period.  
In addition to these legal limitations of the MTPA, including the 
2002 Amendment, there are also practical concerns surrounding its 
implementation. Across India there is a shortage of both access to formal 
healthcare offering reproductive health and abortion services, and a lack 
of legal literacy on women’s reproductive rights. 34  Neither the legal 
framework nor its implementation thus seem to be rights compliant. The 
constitutional right to privacy furnishes new ground to consider whether 
this scenario continues to be licit. The next section thus turns to consider 
what difference, if any, the right to privacy makes to the MTPA’s 
constitutional status.  
3. Privacy: In and Post Puttaswany  
In considering whether a constitutional right to privacy exists the 
Supreme Court of India looked at several of the underlying principles of 
                                                        
29
 The Drug Controller India “approved the use of mifepristone in April 2002 and 
misoprostol in Dec 2006 for termination of pregnancy up to 49 days gestation period. In 
Dec 2008 this combi-pack was approved for the medical termination of pregnancy up to 63 
days gestation”; see Armo et al (n 25) 56-7. 
30
 ibid 59. 
31
 Section 2 of MTPA Amendment 2002. 
32
 See Suchita Srivastava and Anr. v Chandigarh Administration, AIR 2010 SC 235 [4], 
[10], [22], [31]; Ms Z v State of Bihar and Others (2017) SC Civil Appeal No. 10463 of 
2017 [23], [39]. 
33
 Dipika Jain, ‘Time to Rethink Criminalisation of Abortion? Towards a Gender Justice 
Approach’ (2019) 12 (1) National University of Juridical Sciences Law Review; Barpanda et 
al (n 28) 8-9. 
34
 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘Concluding 
Observations: India’ (2014) CEDAW/C/IND/CO/4-5 [30]; UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: India’ (2008) E/C.12/IND/CO/5 8 
[33]. 
 privacy including liberty, autonomy, and dignity. These three principles 
are of relevance to the corpus of reproductive rights. This section will 
examine how the Supreme Court conceptually understood each of these 
principles in Puttaswamy, before examining to what extent the same 
principles already existed in Indian jurisprudence on women’s 
reproductive rights.  
 
A. Liberty and Access to Abortion 
 
In Puttaswamy, a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court unanimously 
agreed that the ‘right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the 
right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as part of the 
freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.’ 35  The six 
concurring judgments declared that a constitutional right to privacy exists 
and drew on the role liberty plays in underpinning the right to privacy. 
Four of the six judgments linked the right to privacy with pregnancy.  
Justice Chandrachud, writing the plurality judgment, referred to the 
US’s ground-breaking reproductive rights cases Griswold v Connecticut 
which struck down the prohibition on the possession, sale, and 
distribution of contraception to married couples;
 36
 and Roe v Wade that 
legalised abortion.
37
 Justice Chandrachud traced how access to 
contraception and abortion are a part of a woman’s rights to privacy and 
liberty as found under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the US Constitution.
38
 Whilst examining the case of 
Griswold, Justice Chandrachud identified how the US Supreme Court 
had ruled that constitutional guarantees, created ‘zones of privacy’ within 
marital relationships and that these zones of privacy must be ‘protected 
from abridgment by the Government’.39 The ability to decide whether to 
use contraception free from State control marked the emergence of 
reproductive rights doctrine as it exists today, whereby individuals are 
able to exercise their liberty and decisional autonomy over their 
reproductive health.  
Citing from Justice Blackmun’s majority judgment in Roe Justice 
Chandrachud focused on how the US Supreme Court’s concept of 
privacy extended personal privacy to decisional autonomy in accessing 
abortion 
 
                                                        
35
 Puttaswamy (n 2) Order of the Court, 2(iii). 
36
 Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965) (US Supreme Court). 
37
 Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973) (US Supreme Court). 
38
 Puttaswamy (n 2), [134 ii], 149. 
39
 Excerpts from Griswold (n 36) as cited in Puttaswamy (n 2) [134(ii)], 145. 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of 
privacy. In a line of decisions, however, the Court has 
recognised that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee 
of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution…This right of privacy, whether it be 
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of 
personal liberty and restrictions upon [S]tate action, as we 
feel it is… [is] broad enough to encompass a woman's 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.40  
 
This interpretation of privacy as liberty is consistent with Indian 
jurisprudence and Puttaswamy where the plurality opinion based the 
core aspect of liberty as an interest in being ‘free from intrusion.’41 Citing 
Justice Subba Rao’s dissenting opinion from the 1964 Supreme Court of 
India decision in Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh,42 the Puttaswamy 
judgment defined liberty as the ‘right of an individual to be free from 
restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions 
or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by 
calculated measures.’43 Puttaswamy also cited the Supreme Court from 
1967 where it was decided that the State must demonstrate that any 
curtailment of liberty, to be constitutionally valid, ‘must satisfy that both 
the fundamental rights are not infringed by showing that there is a law 
and that it does not amount to an unreasonable restriction within the 
meaning of Article 19(2) of the Constitution.’ 44  By citing these cases, 
Puttaswamy reinforced the constitutional principle that no unreasonable 
infringement on the right to liberty is permissible and supported the 
recognition of a zone of privacy protected from State action rooted 
within the right to personal liberty. 
Justice Chandrachud’s focus on the development of the US 
constitutional right to privacy offers a comparative perspective on the 
right to privacy and access to abortion. However, as Justice Chandrachud 
identified, there are limits to this comparative approach. While India and 
the US may share common law legal systems with written constitutions 
vesting the final constitutional authority in a Supreme Court as the 
guardian and translator of ever-evolving fundamental rights, their culture, 
socio-economic status, and political approaches to offering government-
                                                        
40
 Roe (n 37) as cited in Puttaswamy (n 2) [134 (ii)], 149-150, emphasis removed. 
41
 Puttaswamy (n 2) [34], 30. 
42
 Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh (1964) 1 SCR 332. 
43
 ibid 358-359. 
44 Puttaswamy (n 2) [20], 19-20, citing Satwant Singh Sawhney v D Ramarathnam, (1967) 3 
SCR 525, 554. 
 funded healthcare differ drastically.
 45
 Liberty, as a constitutional right, 
provides individuals in the US with the freedom to decide whether to 
terminate a pregnancy, thus enabling an individual to effectively exercise 
reproductive choices, free from arbitrary interference by the State if the 
procedure can be accessed and financed. In India, an absence of 
healthcare infrastructure in rural areas, and vast socio-economic 
deprivation and poverty often means that women are restricted from 
being able to physically access healthcare infrastructure, or from being 
able to access it due to financial or social constraints when it does exist. 
These barriers prevent women from being able to access reproductive 
healthcare services. Limited healthcare infrastructure, poverty, low 
literacy and barriers to access even if facilities exist also prevent women 
from being able to increase their knowledge of, and subsequent effective 
use of contraception. 
In 2010 the Delhi High Court heard two combined petitions which 
demonstrate the failure of government funded schemes to ensure 
vulnerable women below the poverty line have access to reproductive 
healthcare.
46
 Shanti Devi was a Dalit woman from Bihar who lived in a 
slum with her husband in Faridabad, Haryana, on the outskirts of Delhi. 
Their combined monthly income was less than £40 per month, which 
placed her below the poverty line. Shanti had tuberculosis, which she was 
not receiving treatment for, and severe anaemia. Due to Shanti’s caste, 
pre-existing medical conditions, and economic status she was in a 
marginalised and vulnerable position.
47
  
Shanti had been pregnant four times before but only two of her 
children had survived. In the seventh month of her fifth pregnancy 
Shanti fell from a flight of stairs. Following the fall, Shanti saw a dai, a 
traditional midwife, as ‘she could not afford to see a doctor.’48 The dai 
advised her to see a doctor in the hospital but she could only afford to go 
after two weeks, by which time neither Shanti nor the dai could feel the 
baby moving. Shanti presented at the hospital on 19 November 2008 
with signs of swelling, fever and severe anaemia. The doctors found that 
her pregnancy had stopped developing and there were no signs of foetal 
life. She was not given any medication or advice by the local hospital and 
                                                        
45
Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach 
(CUP 2000) 24; NALSA (n 4); Obergefell v Hodges 576 US (2015) (US Supreme Court); 
Khagesh Gautam, ‘Obscenity, Internet, Free Press and Free Speech: Constitutions of India 
and the United States’ (2013) 8 (1) Journal of Comparative Law Missing page number 
where journal starts. 
46
 Laxmi Mandal v Deen Dayal Harinagar Hospital & Others 172 (2010) DLT 9. 
47
 ibid [28]; Jameen Kaur, ‘The Role of Litigation in Ensuring Women’s Reproductive 
Rights: An Analysis of the Shanti Devi Judgement in India’ (2012) 20(39) Reproductive 
Health Matters 24. 
48
 Laxmi Mandal (n 46) [28.1]-[28.7]. 
was told to attend a different hospital, 48-55 kilometres away, that might 
be able to treat her for free due to her economic status. No transport was 
offered. The second hospital treated her anaemia but was unable to 
remove the foetus due to a shortage of beds in the Intensive Care Unit 
and recommended she attend a different hospital. The third hospital 
refused to treat her without a payment of around £3,000. One reason she 
was denied free treatment was that her ration card, used to prove her 
Below the Poverty Line status, was issued in her home State of Bihar and 
not Delhi, where she was trying to access treatment. As she could not 
afford the treatment, she returned to the second hospital and was then 
referred to a fourth hospital. The fourth hospital removed the foetus at 
no cost and kept her admitted for 18 days following a court order.  
On 28 January 2010 Shanti Devi lost her life after haemorrhaging 
whilst giving birth at home to a premature baby in the seventh month of 
her sixth pregnancy. The Delhi High Court found her preventable death 
was rooted in her inability to access free medical care that should have 
been assured to her.
49
 Shanti’s case illustrates the financial, geographic, 
and social barriers that exist, which may prevent a woman from being 
able to exercise legal rights to reproductive healthcare. Similar barriers 
were also demonstrated in the second petition. 
Despite the socio-economic differences between India and the US, 
the notion of privacy as a form of liberty which respects an individual’s 
‘free choices’ was repeated in the Puttaswamy  plurality opinion 50 There 
is little recognition of how an individual’s ability to exercise their liberty 
may fundamentally differ between the US and India due to cultural, 
economic, and geographical constraints. 
The plurality opinion also relied on Western philosophy, specifically 
notions of liberty from JS Mill’s theory. Mill claims that for liberty to 
exist within a society, a person must have ‘absolute’ independence ‘[o]ver 
himself, over his own body and mind, [for] the individual is sovereign.’51 
This principle of ‘sovereignty’ over oneself was a core element of the 
privacy judgment. Justice Chandrachud agreed that: ‘The ability of an 
individual to make choices lies at the core of the human personality…. 
Without the ability to make choices, the inviolability of the personality 
would be in doubt.’52  
Many women in India have a limited ability to make choices 
surrounding their reproductive rights. The UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has identified ‘that the 
defining feature of a poor person is that she has very restricted 
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 opportunities to pursue her well-being.’53 The right to liberty, without pre-
existing access to healthcare, may therefore be of limited use to the 
majority of women in India seeking access to abortion. An alternative 
framework of liberty could instead be Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach which recognises both the need to have ‘one’s bodily 
autonomy treated as sovereign’, and the importance of ‘bodily health’, 
including reproductive health.
54
  
If a future legal challenge seeks to expand access to abortion within 
India, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is a particularly useful 
framework to adopt to explore how India’s emerging right to privacy 
could affect Indian women’s right to reproductive rights, particularly 
access to abortion, considering existing local socio-economic conditions. 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach suggests that particular questions be 
asked that go beyond traditional ways of measuring development, to 
better identify gendered differences regarding access to, and control over, 
resources. Nussbaum suggests a series of questions worth asking: what 
resources exist? To what extent does A have access to X, and control 
over it? How satisfied is she with the choices available to her etc? We 
can then be able to understand to what extent a person is able to 
‘function in a fully human way.’ 55  Nussbaum recognises that women 
globally are less privileged than men and that poverty is inherently 
gendered thus declaring that women ‘lack essential support for leading 
lives that are fully human’.56  
Nussbaum’s framework, which examines the opportunities available 
to individuals, thus provides a guide to identifying intersectional 
differences between women. This recognises that women typically have 
less control over and access to financial resources than men, and that 
their physical location, mobility and other factors will also affect a 
women’s ability to access healthcare. Nussbaum’s approach therefore 
encourages a structural legal and policy driven solution towards making 
rights realisable by focussing on what needs to be provided to make 
rights a reality.  
Martha Nussbaum’s approach resonates with Sandra Fredman’s 
model of achieving substantive equality by adopting a transformative 
framework with four overlapping aims.
57
 Within her framework, 
Fredman argues that it is important to break the historic cycle of 
disadvantage by identifying distributive inequalities and redressing the 
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‘detrimental consequences attached to that status’ which 
disproportionately affect identifiable groups. This approach, which 
targets ‘disadvantage rather than aiming at neutrality’ is better able to 
achieve substantive equality.
58
 Fredman argues recognition of the need to 
increase standards of healthcare already exists in India: improvement of 
public health is amongst the State’s ‘primary duties’ under Article 47 of 
the Constitution. Although it is not justiciable and no standalone right to 
health exists case law has relied on it when defining State obligations.
59
  
In 1996, the Supreme Court declared ‘[i]t is no doubt true that 
financial resources are needed for providing these facilities [emergency 
medical treatment]. But at the same time it cannot [be] ignored that it is 
the Constitutional obligation of the State to provide adequate medical 
services to the people.’ 60  The Court further decided that the central 
government be a party to the proceedings and made it a joint obligation 
of the centre as well as the state governments to provide medical services 
and that a ‘time-bound plan for providing these services should be 
chalked out’.61 This demonstrates a willingness within India to expand 
State duties regarding the allocation of funding for, and access to, 
increased healthcare provision. Fredman argues that the Supreme Court 
has therefore willingly identified the ‘positive duties to provide 
healthcare, even if this involves requiring the State to provide resources 
or to improve the efficiency of its administration.’ 62  This proactive 
approach, rooted in India’s Directive Principles, suggests the socio-
economic right to health is increasingly becoming justiciable and legal 
challenges seeking the broadening of reproductive rights are likely to be 
successful. 
 Puttaswamy, despite considering how the right to liberty has been 
used to shape access to abortion in the US, failed to consider the 
implications of its judgment for the majority of women in India. Despite 
India’s positive obligations, under the MTPA (to make access to 
termination of pregnancy services available in government hospitals and 
approved locations) and under article 47 (to improve public health) of 
the Constitution, access is not always guaranteed, especially given India’s 
vast rural population and under-funded healthcare infrastructure.
63
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 Marginalised women, particularly religious minorities and Dalit and tribal 
women are often unable to pay the more expensive private fees, and/or 
travel the longer distances to access public clinics leaving them vulnerable 
to not being able to access formal medical care.
64
 This makes 
economically marginalised and vulnerable women less likely to access 
formal methods of safe abortion. Estimates claim that for every legal 
abortion that is recorded between two and eleven illegal abortions take 
place.
65
 As Siddhivinayak Hirve remarks, ‘although it may not be the case 
that abortions in unapproved facilities are all unsafe, it can still be 
assumed that safe abortion care is still not widely available.’66  
As a consequence of the above, many women in India today do not 
have the access to abortion services that the enactment of the MTPA 
intended and India has the same unsafe levels of abortion taking place as 
would be expected in a country where abortion is illegal.
67
 The right to 
liberty with reference to access to abortion and ‘sovereignty’ over one’s 
body will therefore require more than a constitutional right to privacy to 
be meaningful for millions of women across India to have enhanced 
reproductive rights.  
Health and rights activists have therefore been campaigning for 
improved service provision, especially in rural areas, amendments to 
legislation, and courts are regularly approached by petitioners seeking to 
enforce or broaden the MTPA’s provisions. The UN has repeatedly 
declared that for the right to health to be an accessible reality for all 
people, States must ensure public health and healthcare facilities, and 
goods and services, are available, accessible, acceptable and of good 
quality.
68
 The UN has also repeatedly recognised the need for positive 
measures to ensure that individuals are ‘enabled and assisted’ in being 
able to access healthcare services.
69
 These guidelines could be better 
adopted within India to enable a pregnant person’s right to liberty is 
actually protected. 
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Applying the UN’s Available, Accessible, Acceptable, and Quality 
framework to reproductive rights means access to abortion must 
physically exist within functioning public health and healthcare facilities, 
goods, services, and programmes; be of good quality, and that these 
facilities and programmes must have trained medical staff and essential 
drugs. Facilities must be within physical/geographic reach, including in 
rural areas and be accessible to all people regardless of their health or 
other status including disability. For health facilities to be accessible they 
must also be affordable. Puttaswamy’s recognition of the role of liberty in 
securing a right to reproductive privacy, though, does not develop what is 
required to enable women in India to be able to exercise the right to 
privacy with reference to their reproductive autonomy. It is useful to note 
the role of dignity here in developing the right to privacy in this context.  
When claims for reproductive rights started approaching courts in 
other jurisdictions, the right to access/provide contraception and abortion 
services were typically granted under the ambit of a patient’s rights to 
make decisions regarding their reproductive health within constitutional 
guarantees of privacy.
70
 Increasingly, however, the role of a person’s 
dignity to be able to access safe, legal, proximate, affordable, and non-
discriminatory, services free from unjustified interference or restrictions 
has been relied upon in cases surrounding reproductive rights.  
The UN Human Rights Committee, CEDAW Committee, and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights have all emphasised the 
importance of dignity in enabling women to fully exercise their 
reproductive rights.
71
 This shift in judicial thinking recognises the impact 
upon a pregnant person’s wellbeing as a rights holder if access to quality 
medical care is either interfered with or not available.   
The weight of these comparative and international decisions and the 
need to be able to exercise choices that Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach explores is reflected in Puttaswamy, where the judgment linked 
the ability of individuals to make ‘essential’ life choices with liberty and 
dignity: 
 
Privacy recognises the autonomy of the individual and 
the right of every person to make essential choices which 
affect the course of life. In doing so privacy recognises 
that living a life of dignity is essential for a human being 
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 to fulfil the liberties and freedoms which are the 
cornerstone of the Constitution.72 
 
Justice Chandrachud also asserted that ‘[w]ithout the ability to make 
choices, the inviolability of the personality would be in doubt… Hence 
privacy is a postulate of human dignity itself.’73 Linking the right to privacy 
with rights to liberty and dignity makes it inevitable that future challenges 
to existing abortion legislation will rely on liberty and dignity based 
arguments to augment the right to health perspective which prioritises 
access and availability as much as decisional autonomy.
74
 Without these 
improvements in access, the reaffirmation in Puttaswamy of the 
importance of liberty in exercising reproductive choices free from 
intrusion by the State, is unlikely to have any benefit for the majority of 
Indian women seeking to exercise their reproductive rights.  
If the framework of the MTPA is challenged by petitioners seeking to 
increase rights to reproductive health and broader access to abortion 
within India, the new constitutional right to privacy provides a useful 
framework. Puttaswamy’s recognition of the co-existence and inter-
dependence of privacy, liberty, dignity, and the positive obligations that 
are necessary to fulfil women’s rights to reproductive healthcare set the 
foundations for a new right to reproductive healthcare model. Adopting 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and using it to focus on what steps the 
government needs to take to make abortion and reproductive rights an 
accessible reality could effectively realise women’s right to liberty to 
exercise choices within their zone of privacy are more effectively 
realisable. 
 
B. Privacy, Autonomy and Sex-Determination 
Puttaswamy repeatedly drew on domestic and comparative jurisprudence 
to define how privacy and autonomy are interlinked. The judgment 
repeated the South African Constitutional Court’s holding that: ‘[p]rivacy 
recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and 
autonomy’.75 It further added that autonomy ‘must mean’ individuals can 
act free ‘from interference by the [S]tate.’ 76  In India, the right to 
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autonomy can only be examined in light of the actual ability to exercise 
that autonomy within the social fabric of the society and the restrictions it 
places on women’s agency.77 
There is growing recognition of the fact that poverty is inherently 
gendered, that women have less access to formal and higher education, 
less access to the formal workforce, and significantly less ownership of 
property and land, and subsequently less access to and control over 
resources.
78
 Within family and marital structures women may not benefit 
from access to resources or have control over how resources are 
allocated.
79
 This had lead Meghan Campbell to claim that poverty is a 
gendered phenomenon and ‘being a woman both causes and contributes 
to poverty’.80 Combined with a patriarchal social structure and a strong 
social preference for male children many women in India report living in 
coercive environments that force them to access abortions, especially if 
they are carrying a female foetus. In 2004, the Abortion Assessment 
Project conducted a comprehensive social study using community-based 
household surveys, qualitative studies and working papers to assess the 
prevalence of formal and informal abortion in India. The data gathered 
‘indicated the prevalence of the practice of sex determination and 
abortion of female foetuses.’81  
The Abortion Assessment Project’s findings also highlighted the lack 
of female agency within decision-making processes surrounding 
terminations and identified women’s husbands and family members as 
the primary decision-makers surrounding women’s reproductive choices. 
Women were reported to express their ‘helplessness’ at deciding whether 
to have a termination, that the decision was ‘rarely their own’82 and that 
‘their status in the family and sometimes the very survival of their 
marriage depended on their ability to produce sons.’ 83  The research 
demonstrated the low status, and low decision-making power women 
often have within their marriages. National Census records of the child 
sex-ratio indicate this is a real and continuing concern.
84
  The Census of 
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 India reported the national child sex-ratio to be 945 in 1991, 927 in 
2001, and 914 in 2011.
85
 This suggests a continual increase in the number 
of sex-preference based abortions performed nationally between 1991-
2011.
86
 
Autonomy was described in Puttaswamy as the ability to exercise free 
choice and the ability to have ‘control over the body’ by consenting to, or 
denying medical procedures you may be subjected to.
87
 It has been 
argued that there is tension between the MTPA which creates a right for 
women to exercise autonomy over their bodies by allowing them to 
terminate pregnancies and the restrictions imposed by the Pre-
Conception Pre-Natal Diagnostics Techniques (Prohibition of Sex 
Selection) Act, (PCPNDTA) that prohibits sex-determination.
88
  Whilst 
the PCPNDTA prohibits all sex-determination and does not regulate 
abortion, it is accepted that India’s artificial sex-ratio is a result of 
abortions taking place after sex-determination has been performed based 
on the preference for a male child.
89
  
Despite the neat legal separation between sex-determination and 
access to abortion, the social reality is rather convoluted. In 1978, after 
AIIMS, one of India’s leading government hospitals, recognised a 
pattern between sex-determination and subsequent sex-preference based 
abortions, the Union Health Minister for India banned sex-
determination tests in all government-run hospitals.
90
 The ban failed to 
discourage their social demand, which came to be served in the private 
sector. From the late 1970s onwards ‘amniocentesis and other sex-
selection tests…became the “bread and butter”…for many 
gynaecologists.’ 91  Private healthcare facilities were not prohibited from 
practising sex-determination until 1994 when the PCPNDTA came into 
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force and applied to all healthcare institutions. Despite the complete ban, 
its implementation remains weak.
92
 
To decrease sex-selective abortions the State government in Punjab 
launched the ‘Nawanshahr Model’ in 2005 which used technology to 
collect data on pregnancies from the first trimester until birth and shared 
this information between government departments, NGOs, and outreach 
workers. Between the third and fifth month of a person’s pregnancy, 
female employees within a local government office were tasked with 
calling pregnant women to enquire after the development of their 
pregnancies. According to the Office of the Deputy Commissioner of 
Nawanshahr, this measure was intended to ‘leaves [sic] an invisible 
impact on the minds of the pregnant lady as well as on her in-laws that 
somebody is monitoring and watching them… [and it] discourages them 
not [sic] to go for [a] sex determination test and then abortion 
subsequently…’ 93  The Chandigarh Administration and State of 
Maharashtra both attempted to implement data collection programmes 
to track pregnancies with the intention of decreasing the number of sex-
selective abortions in 2008 and 2011 respectively.
94
 Such programmes 
clearly infringe upon women’s rights to privacy and bodily autonomy. 
Feminists and government agencies in India are often at loggerheads 
within and between each other when trying to address these social 
concerns. Some claim the intent and substance of the programmes are 
autonomy-affirming as they protect women’s rights. 95 Others, however, 
claim that the processes involved are utilised to police women’s bodies 
and that the restrictions are anti-autonomous, and thus are a violation of 
women’s right to life and the right to health.96 Feminist academic Nivedita 
Menon has argued that ‘there is a profound philosophical incoherence 
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 involved in arguing for abortion in terms of the right of women to control 
their bodies and at the same time, demanding that women be restricted 
by law from choosing specifically to abort female foetuses.’ 97  Menon 
argues that even within the coercive patriarchal structure of society that 
dictates a preference for male children, women should be allowed to 
exercise their autonomy and agency in making reproductive decisions. A 
UN inter-agency statement also stated that restrictions imposed to 
prevent an imbalanced sex-ratio ‘should not result in the curtailing of the 
human rights of women.’98 
Where women are blamed for giving birth to female children and 
fear being abandoned by their husbands and families, their choices are 
not free choices, but an expression of the limited agency women possess 
within their circumstances. This lead Mallika Kaur Sarkaria to label sex-
selective abortion as an ‘agent of patriarchy’.99 Campbell has highlighted 
that women’s psychological insecurity, voicelessness, economic 
disadvantage, compromised autonomy, social exclusion and 
marginalisation are the result of ‘patriarchal power relationships between 
men and women.’100 The UN has recognised that sex-preference ‘is a 
symptom of pervasive social, cultural, political and economic injustices 
against women, and a manifest violation of women’s human rights’.101 To 
uphold a woman’s right to autonomy, these inequalities must be resolved 
without denying women access to abortion. Prima facie, there seems to 
be a conflict between respecting a pregnant person’s autonomy and 
reducing the imbalanced sex-ratio. 
Since the PCPNDTA’s enactment, several petitions have sought 
more effective implementation of the PCPNDTA.
102
 Similarly there have 
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also been challenges to the Act’s reach and attempts made to carve out 
exceptions to the prohibition of sex-determination. Two notable cases 
are Vinod Soni v Union of India,103 and Vijay Sharma and Kirti Sharma v 
Union of India.104 Both of these cases came up before the High Court of 
Bombay in 2005. In Vinod Soni, the petitioners argued that their 
personal liberty, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of 
India, should extend to being allowed to ‘determine the nature of family’ 
including the ‘sex of that family which he or she may eventually decided 
[sic] to have and/or develop’.105 They argued that the PCPNDTA was an 
unconstitutional infringement of that right. The Court held that as 
‘nature’ decides whether a male or female foetus develops ‘[t]he right to 
life or personal liberty cannot be expanded to mean that [it includes] the 
right… to determine the sex of a child which may come into existence’106 
and dismissed the case.  
Three months after deciding the Vinod Soni case, the same court 
gave its judgment in the Vijay Sharma and Kirti Sharma case. Here the 
Court dismissed the Article 21 claim citing the prior judgment but heard 
the claim that the PCPNDTA violated the petitioners’ constitutional right 
to equality. The petitioners had argued that the Act was not intended to 
provide for a blanket ban on sex-determination, rather it was intended to 
prevent its ‘misuse’. They argued that if a family already had one or two 
daughters then parents would not be misusing sex-determination to 
prevent the birth of daughters but instead could use sex-determination to 
‘balance’ their family with a male child. They further argued that having a 
second or third daughter, if the child was not wanted, could constitute a 
‘grave mental injury to a woman’ and therefore sex-preference abortions 
should be allowed under the MTPA.
107
  
The High Court acknowledged that the PCPNDTA restricts parents’ 
ability to choose the sex of their children and considered whether this 
restriction was legally permissible by assessing whether the restriction was 
proportionate. The Court ruled that a woman who wants to terminate 
her pregnancy due to the sex of the foetus ‘cannot be equated’ to a 
woman who wants to terminate her foetus’s development under the 
terms laid down by the MTPA.
108
 It further argued that to permit being 
pregnant with a female foetus to be recognised as ‘injury to mental 
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 health’ would be ‘to encourage sex selection which is not permissible.’109 
It thus held that the blanket ban on sex-selective abortions was indeed 
constitutional.
110
 In considering whether the PCPNDTA was necessary, 
the High Court found that the State was ‘duty bound to intervene in such 
matters to uphold the welfare of the [sic] society, especially of the [sic] 
women and children’ and that ‘regulation of medical technology [is] in 
the larger interests of the society.’111 As the sex ratio disparity was not 
‘disputed by the petitioners’112 the Act’s existence, and its aim to prevent 
sex-determination, and thus subsequent sex-determined abortion, was 
considered to have a legitimate aim and to be necessary. This 
interpretation is consistent with comparative  jurisprudence where a 
‘pressing social need’ has been used to establish that which may be 
necessary.
113
 
In deciding whether an act is proportionate a court may apply the 
‘balancing test’. This test balances ‘the weight of the individual interest 
affected’ with ‘the importance of certain governmental aims and the need 
for the interference to achieve such aims’.114 In Vijay Sharma and Kirti 
Sharma the High Court found that, given ‘the frightening figures which 
show the imbalance in male to female ratio’ and ‘that there is a 
considerable decline in the number of female children’ it has ‘no doubt 
that if the use of the said techniques for sex selection is not banned, there 
will be unprecedented imbalance in male to female ratio and that will 
have disastrous effect on the society.’115 It therefore found that the need to 
prevent such a ‘disastrous effect on society’ outweighed the impact on 
individual rights. 
The High Court also declared that, should sex-selection prior to, or 
after conception be allowed, it would offend the ‘dignity of women’ and 
‘violate’ their right to life. 116  The High Court stated that sex-selection 
‘violates Article 39(e) of the Constitution’ which creates a ‘principle of 
[S]tate policy that the health and strength of women is not to be 
abused…[and] ignores Article 51A(e) of the Constitution which states that 
it shall be the duty of every citizen of India to renounce practices 
derogatory to the dignity of women.’117 The PCPNDTA was thus found 
to be proportionate. The creation of the new constitutional right to 
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privacy may however mean that the PCPNDTA’s legitimacy is again 
open to challenge. 
In Puttaswamy, the Supreme Court had ruled that, ‘[p]rivacy 
recognises the autonomy of the individual and the right of every person 
to make essential choices which affect the course of life.’118 It defined 
privacy as ‘the ultimate expression of the sanctity of the individual…a 
constitutional value which straddles across the spectrum of fundamental 
rights and protects for the individual a zone of choice and self-
determination.’119 It also gave special recognition to the right of privacy 
within ‘family life, marriage [and] procreation’120. At first glance, it can 
seem that an individual may have the right to determine the sex of their 
foetus using the autonomy basis of the right to privacy. This, however, 
may be a misreading of the implications of  Puttaswamy.  
It is useful to recall that the Court in Puttaswamy had also held that, 
‘rights conferred on citizens and non-citizens are not merely individual or 
personal rights. They have a large social and political content’ and 
autonomous acts are not absolute as they may be restricted to protect co-
existing inalienable rights.
121
 Further, the Court had cited Craig Ster and 
Gregory Jones’ work, which  claims that any act, however autonomous, 
which violates an inalienable right is morally invalid and therefore 
‘pretend[s] to an autonomy that does not exist [and that] [i]nalienable 
rights are precisely directed against such false autonomy.’122 The Court 
had thus found that ‘[t]he right to privacy, which is an intrinsic part of the 
right to life and liberty’ can only be restricted if there is ‘a law in existence 
to justify an encroachment on privacy’; that such a law pursues ‘a 
legitimate [S]tate aim’ which ‘falls within the zone of reasonableness’ and 
that ‘the means which are adopted by the legislature are proportional to 
the object and needs sought to be fulfilled by the law.’123  
In Vijay Sharma and Kirti Sharma, the Bombay High Court  
articulated how the PCPNDTA pursues a public health aim recognising 
the significant and irreparable consequences of sex-selective abortions 
that violate women’s right to life and dignity.  It successfully 
demonstrated that the PCPNDTA’s restrictions were a necessary and 
proportionate restriction on the right to autonomy and privacy. The High 
Court’s references to the dignity of women, and the subsequent interest 
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 in not allowing sex-determination are consistent with how Puttaswamy  
referred to the dignity of women and how one autonomous norm cannot 
be used to violate another. As such the restriction is in fact autonomy 
affirming. It is therefore unlikely that a constitutional challenge to the 
restriction on sex-determination using the new constitutional right to 
privacy would be successful as it would not outweigh the constitutional 
principles it will be measured against.  
 
C. Dignity, Foetal Rights and the Right to Access 
Abortion after Twenty Weeks 
 
Notions of dignity are threaded throughout Puttaswamy. Dignity is 
‘recognised to be an essential part of the right to life and accrues to all 
persons on account of being humans.’ 124  It was seen as both a 
‘constitutional value and a constitutional goal’125 and that ‘[i]t is the duty of 
the State not only to protect the [sic] human dignity but to facilitate it by 
taking positive steps in that direction.’126 Dignity was also recognised as 
part of India’s ‘constitutional culture’127 with ‘reflections of dignity’ found 
in the constitutional guarantee against arbitrariness and the protection of 
freedom and liberty.
128
 Western references to dignity are also present 
where the Court referred to Ronald Dworkin’s theory that it is necessary 
that men ‘have fundamental rights against the government’ in order to 
protect their dignity,
129
 and the US Supreme Court’s decision in Roe 
which declared that ‘choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, 
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’130  
In India the judiciary has been inconsistent in defining when foetal 
rights to life begin and subsequently when they start to compete with a 
pregnant person’s rights. In particular, the absence of legislation on when 
abortions may take place if a foetus has been diagnosed with a condition 
that may affect its quality of life, contributes to this inconsistency.
131
 The 
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132
 In these cases abortion may be 
prohibited in all circumstances,
133
 or only allowed when there’s an 
immediate risk to the life of the pregnant person.
134
 When this threshold 
is not met the pregnant person may be denied agency over their bodily 
autonomy regarding the termination of their pregnancy, thereby 
intrinsically affecting their right to life with dignity and non-discriminatory 
access to healthcare. The emerging global norm is that rights are afforded 
to a life when it is born, though some countries recognise a State interest 
in foetal rights from the point of viability.
135
 In India, a woman may only 
have an abortion after twenty weeks if there is a risk to her life, indicating 
a balance between the pregnant person’s rights, and foetal rights from 
this point forwards.
136
 
In 2016, the Supreme Court of India issued an order in response to a 
civil writ petition granting the petitioner, Ms X, permission to abort her 
pregnancy. Ms X was twenty-three and a half weeks pregnant. Her foetus 
was found to have ‘severe multiple congenital anomalies, [meaning] the 
foetus is not compatible with extra-uterine life.’137 Under the MTPA a 
termination of pregnancy is allowed if there exists ‘a substantial risk that 
if the child were born, it would suffer from such physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.’ 138  This provision is 
however only applicable to pregnancies up to twenty weeks of gestation. 
Ms X was beyond the twentieth week of gestation. The only provision 
that permits a termination beyond the twenty-week limit is section 5, 
which states abortion is permissible if: ‘the termination of such pregnancy 
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 is immediately necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.’139 The 
pregnancy, however, presented no immediate risk to the petitioner’s life.  
Despite the Medical Board’s opinion that the petitioner had no 
‘active medical complaints’ the Board argued: ‘[The r]isk to the mother 
of continuation of pregnancy can gravely endanger her physical and 
mental health…Hence the Medical Board advises that the patient, Ms X 
should not continue with this pregnancy.’140 The Supreme Court agreed 
with the Medical Board and granted the petitioner the liberty to 
terminate her pregnancy, arguably thus upholding her right to life with 
dignity by not imposing upon her significant and unwanted caring 
responsibilities.
141
 In 2018, the High Court of Bombay also granted a 
petitioner the right to terminate her pregnancy, ‘advanced of thirty weeks 
of gestation’, when the Medical Board claimed that her foetus ‘fulfils 
criteria of “substantial risk of serious physical handicap with very high 
morbidity and mortality.”’ 142  Here too there was no reference to the 
pregnant person’s life being at risk. Instead the Court said it had ‘no 
reason to doubt the opinion of the Medical Board’ and permitted the 
abortion.
143
  
These cases demonstrate that courts are granting access to abortion 
beyond the provisions of the MTPA when foetal conditions affect the 
foetus’ ability to survive to term or post birth, or are likely to impact the 
infant’s quality of life once it is born. Courts are also interpreting the 
psychological impact on a pregnant person of continuing with a 
pregnancy where the foetus will not be able to survive outside of the 
womb as grave enough to justify a termination of pregnancy beyond 
twenty weeks. This upholds the pregnant person’s right to choice and 
dignity. 
The right to dignity has also been used to protect women from 
unwanted invasions of their reproductive choices. In the oft cited case of 
Suchita Srivastava v Chandigarh Administration, the Supreme Court 
overturned a lower court’s order that the petitioner should have a 
termination of pregnancy against her wishes.
144
 The Court found that a 
woman’s ‘privacy, dignity and bodily integrity’ must be respected and 
‘there should be no restriction whatsoever on the exercise of 
reproductive choices’ including the choice to ‘procreate as well as to 
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abstain from procreating.’145 Here again the Supreme Court prioritised 
women’s rights to dignity by upholding a petitioner’s wishes, in this case, 
by not allowing an unwanted medical procedure to be performed.  
In other cases when a pregnant person’s circumstances fulfil the 
grounds under which a termination of pregnancy can take place under 
the MTPA, extra-legal barriers have been created by the courts. Courts 
have sought an estranged husband’s consent to terminate a pregnancy 
even when the petitioner was destitute and the pregnancy was the result 
of rape.
146
 The creation of extra-legal barriers and the inconsistencies 
between judgments in the interpretation of the MTPA’s provisions 
means that a person's ability to exercise their reproductive health rights, 
especially in cases where the pregnancy is beyond twenty weeks and there 
is no physical risk to their survival, is at the mercy of judges’ inclinations 
more than the rule of law.  
Judgments supporting a petitioner’s plea to terminate or continue a 
pregnancy are often based on women’s rights to privacy, bodily 
autonomy, and dignity, and not on the provisions of the MTPA. In some 
cases, the courts don’t justify their decisions.147 In other cases women’s 
petitions to have their pregnancies terminated have been denied as the 
foetus’s chances of survival are measured above their anticipated quality 
of life. In these cases, the pregnant person’s well-being, and the impact of 
continuing with an unwanted pregnancy on their right to life is not 
considered at all.
148
  
Although India doesn’t legally recognise foetal rights, the MTPA’s 
restriction on access to abortion beyond twenty weeks, unless the 
pregnant person’s life is at risk, does in effect create a duty on the State 
to defend the right of the foetus beyond twenty weeks of gestation. In 
Ireland, until recently, there was a constitutional obligation to protect the 
foetal right to life ‘as far as it is practicable.’ 149 Ireland’s obligation to 
protect foetal life was interpreted to mean women’s requests for 
abortions were denied, even when the foetus had been diagnosed with a 
condition incompatible with life. Fiona de Londras critiqued the law’s 
implementation claiming that the foetal right to life was more akin to a 
‘right to be born’150 regardless of the life-expectancy post-delivery. The 
denial of abortion in these circumstances resulted in the UN Human 
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 Rights Committee’s finding that women’s rights to non-discrimination, 
privacy and freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment were 
violated.
151
  
Indian courts’ inconsistent approach to deciding whether people can 
have abortions beyond twenty weeks regardless of whether their foetus 
has a condition not compatible with life or likely to have a disability that 
may affect its quality of life can have unintended consequences. The 
Centre for Reproductive Rights recently reported that a woman had an 
abortion at nineteen weeks before being able to confirm whether her 
foetus had a medical condition that would affect its quality of life as she 
feared she would not be able to have a termination after twenty weeks 
when the test results were due. Many accurate diagnostic tests can only 
take place after twenty weeks of gestation and this is beyond the limit 
imposed by the MTPA that permits abortion due to foetal conditions. A 
pregnant person should never have to decide whether to terminate a 
pregnancy before a medical diagnosis is confirmed. Subjecting a person 
to such a grave decision when they are not fully informed or denying 
access to abortion after the twenty week limit once they have the test 
results, undermines their rights to dignity, autonomy, liberty, privacy, 
equality, and non-discrimination.  
The failure of the 2002 Amendment to extend the period within 
which abortions may legally take place if a foetus is likely to be disabled 
fails to recognise medical advancements in technology which are now 
better able to detect foetal conditions beyond twenty weeks of gestation 
that may affect a foetus’s chance of fully developing in utero or of 
survival/quality of life post-delivery. Modern tests are better able to 
predict a foetus’s quality of life and anticipated caring responsibilities. 
This has led some medical practitioners and courts within India to argue 
that if a condition has been diagnosed and the pregnant person does not 
want to continue with the pregnancy, then ‘[f]orced continuation of a 
pregnancy is an infringement of [the] right to privacy and dignity of a 
woman’. 152  Now that a constitutional right to privacy exists, one 
component of which is dignity, it is possible that cases that meet Section 
3’s conditions may go to court challenging the 20 week gestational limit. 
There are though, limits to these arguments. Disability rights are one 
set of limitations to an overly broad right to abortion. In the US, pro-
choice advocates have argued that women should be allowed to access 
abortion services if: ‘the termination of pregnancy spares the child a life 
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of suffering’,153 or it ‘spares parents innumerable hardships and allows 
them to plan their family around monetary concerns.’154 In India parents-
to-be are allowed to terminate pregnancies, up to twenty weeks, on 
‘eugenic grounds’155 where there is ‘a substantial risk that if the child were 
born, it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be 
seriously handicapped’. 156  Disability rights activists have argued the 
justifications used in the US and India to terminate foetuses likely to be 
born disabled ‘manifests a bias against disability’ and subsequently 
devalues disabled lives.
157
  
Kavana Ramaswamy argues while American justifications for abortion 
in the case of foetuses likely to have disabilities may seem benign, there 
are parallels with Indian justifications for sex-preferred abortions. 
Ramaswamy identifies three justifications used to terminate pregnancies 
where the foetus is likely to be born disabled as including: first, to spare 
‘the child a life of suffering’; second, to spare ‘the parents innumerable 
hardships’; and third, to allow parents ‘to raise a child with the best 
possible chance of success’.158 She then draws parallels between these and 
justifications for aborting female foetuses, such as: first, females ‘are 
likely to lead lives devoid of real opportunities’; second, ‘parents are 
expected to take responsibility for defending a female child from 
patriarchal violence, arguably increasing the cost and labour for parents’; 
and third, by identifying the economic costs of female children, including 
the burden of dowry.
159
 
Research in the Indian context shows how some medical 
practitioners in the private sector, who were able to make large profits 
from practising sex-determination and subsequent abortions, openly 
proffered justifications and support for the practise of aborting female 
foetuses which echo Ramaswamy’s claims: ‘…in developing countries like 
India, as the parents are encouraged to limit their family to two offspring, 
they will have a right to quality in these two as far as can be assured. 
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 Amniocentesis provides help in this direction.’160 Motivations to perform 
sex-selective and disability-selective abortions are therefore interrelated. 
The Forum against Sex Determination and Sex Preselection claimed that 
doctors have interpreted, presumably with their patients’ consent, that 
the ‘mental health’ provision within the MTPA includes ‘trauma that the 
woman would be subjected to if she had a female child, and on this basis 
have conducted abortions up to twenty weeks.’161 Terms such as ‘quality’ 
and ‘trauma’ echo arguments where abortions have been campaigned for 
when a pregnant woman is carrying a foetus that is likely to be born 
disabled. As eugenic abortions reduce the number of people with 
disabilities from being born, Ramaswamy argues when sex-determination 
is practised it is ‘akin to wiping out women to address the problem of 
patriarchy.’162  
Puttaswamy recognised how principles of autonomy, liberty, and 
dignity as constitutional provisions, have influenced reproductive rights in 
the US, but failed to consider how these should be balanced in cases of 
female foetuses or foetuses diagnosed with impairments. While 
Puttaswamy answered whether a constitutional right to privacy existed, 
the judgment also indicated a clear awareness of how the iteration of a 
self-standing right to privacy would affect other areas of law within India. 
This recognition of the potential impact of the judgment echoes the 
‘politics of rights’ theory where Scheingold recognised that rights may be 
used to influence social change and that politics and governments often 
rely on law as a symbol of legitimacy to buttress their policies.
163
 
Scheingold also claims that American politics’ capacity to ‘adjust 
peacefully to changing conditions is attributable in large measure to a 
penchant for channelling serious conflict into legal procedures.’ 164 The 
symbolic legitimacy of law as a tool to settle complex debates peacefully 
may then provide a framework to resolve competing claims to dignity 
and autonomy in pregnancies where a foetus is diagnosed with a life-
limiting condition. 
In cases where a foetus has a condition wholly incompatible with its 
survival it may be seen as futile to impose restrictions on a pregnant 
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person’s autonomy by limiting their access to abortion.165 In cases where a 
foetus has been diagnosed with an impairment, the extent of which is 
unknown or not fatal, there are more complicated rights arguments with 
a pregnant person’s dignity and autonomy on one hand, and disability 
rights campaigners speaking on behalf of unborn foetuses and disabled 
lives on the other. The extent of terminations being performed on 
foetuses with Down Syndrome has reached such proportions that there 
have been claims the national governments in Denmark and Iceland 
have allowed for its eradication and extinction, as the birth rate of 
children with Down Syndrome reaches almost non-existent levels.
166
 In 
these cases, campaigners are arguing that ‘feminist choice’ is being used 
to cloak ableism.
167
 While the Danish Ambassador to Ireland denied 
allegations that ‘Denmark has a eugenic policy to eradicate Down 
[S]yndrome’, 168  Germany has witnessed emotive federal debates on 
whether public health insurers should fund prenatal Down Syndrome 
tests.
169
 In the US, Ohio considered a Bill to prevent practitioners from 
performing abortions if the motivation was to terminate a pregnancy 
where the foetus was diagnosed with Down Syndrome.
170
 These events 
demonstrate how politically charged access to abortion versus disability 
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 campaigns can be. Recognising rights to dignity, autonomy, and liberty as 
reproductive rights, must therefore reflect the complex social context 
within which they operate.  
Foetal protection laws that enable the prosecution of a pregnant 
person if they harm their foetus, for example due to drug use, do not 
also restrict women from accessing abortion.
171
 This demonstrates a 
conscious balancing of the restriction of one practice, but not another. 
Disability rights are still a nascent discourse in India, similar to, and 
perhaps reflective of its formal exclusion from international human rights 
law until relatively recently.
172
 The arguments it raises are powerful and 
any consideration of them will have to balance significant competing 
rights.  
Puttaswamy built on how the right to privacy has shaped reproductive 
rights internationally without considering how the concept of dignity can 
be used to apply to both pregnant persons and foetuses or recognising 
that the global norm is that foetus’ do not have rights. In 2014, the 
Government of India issued the Draft Medical Termination of 
Pregnancy Bill. The Bill suggested amending the MTPA to read that no 
limitation, based on the length of a pregnancy, should apply if there has 
been a diagnosis of “substantial foetal abnormalities”. 173  This suggests 
support for a pregnant person to terminate their pregnancy if foetal 
conditions affecting quality of life post birth have been diagnosed. This 
interpretation is consistent with international human rights law 
approaches and has been followed in previous domestic jurisprudence.  
Any future consideration of how the right to privacy influences the 
reproductive rights discourse in India must engage substantively with 
domestic peculiarities and show a nuanced appreciation of how 
competing rights and interests must be addressed within the privacy 
discourse. While balancing these competing rights it will be useful to 
remember that internationally foetuses are generally not recognised as 
rights holders and that any balancing or proportionality test that is 
applied will have to consider the significant consequences of restricting a 
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Families. It was only in 2006 that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities was adopted, which came into force in 2008. 
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woman’s rights to protect a foetus’s rights. It is likely, considering existing 
domestic jurisprudence which has upheld women’s rights to autonomy, 
liberty, and dignity, that future judgments will also uphold a woman’s 
right to abortion over protecting foetal rights thus continuing the already 
existing sense of justice promoted in Puttaswamy. 
4. Conclusion 
In the 48 years since the MTPA was drafted, both judicial thinking and 
medical developments in technology have significantly evolved in India. 
The most recent attempts to reform the MTPA in 2014 and 2017  
attempted to increase access to abortion up to twenty-four weeks. The 
2014 Bill also attempted to allow abortions in the case of foetuses likely 
to be born disabled without a gestational limit and proposed including 
nurses and midwives as recognised ‘healthcare providers’. This would 
have enabled them to prescribe abortion inducing medication in order to 
increase accessibility, especially in rural areas. However, neither of the 
Bills attempted to decriminalise abortion or create a standalone right to 
abortion, and neither was passed. The new constitutional right to privacy 
may help change this. 
This article has explored how Puttaswamy defined privacy, 
particularly with reference to the constitutional values of liberty, 
autonomy, and dignity that were explored in the Supreme Court’s 
decision. It then considered how the constitutional right to privacy could 
apply to reproductive rights in India and paid particular attention to three 
thematic areas: access to abortion; sex-determination; and the potential 
of competing rights considering developments in disability rights 
campaigns.  
Section 1 focused on what liberty should be interpreted to mean with 
reference to reproductive rights. It agreed with the claims in Puttaswamy, 
that without the ability to exercise free choices the right to liberty would 
be in doubt. It referred to Shanti Devi’s experiences that contributed to 
her preventable death and highlighted the economic, geographic, and 
social discrimination women in India are vulnerable to experiencing, thus 
preventing the effective realisation of their legal rights. The section 
recommended identifying what resources and opportunities have 
historically been denied to women and adopting Martha Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach to more effectively redress historic inequality. It 
also recommended drawing inspiration from Sandra Fredman’s 
transformative equality framework in structuring India’s positive duties 
towards effectively realising women’s rights to reproductive health. This 
 approach would particularly focus on improving the availability of health-
infrastructure in rural as well as urban areas to increase access and 
reducing financial or other barriers that prevent women from being able 
to freely exercise their rights.  
Section 2 examined Nivedita Menon’s assertion that there is a 
disconnect between claiming that women should have rights to autonomy 
and access to abortion and simultaneously prohibiting their access to sex-
determination. It examined existing jurisprudence challenging the validity 
of restrictions on sex-determination and found co-existing constitutional 
and public policy interests that justify a ban on sex-selective practices. 
Section 3 illustrated how dignity may be used to support a wide right to 
abortion but that competing disability rights narratives caution against a 
move towards an overly broad right to abortion. Contrasting disability 
rights with a woman’s right to abortion this section predicts the right to 
privacy, as found within Puttaswamy, will be used to outweigh competing 
foetal rights concerns. 
To conclude, there are distinct similarities in how dignity, liberty, and 
autonomy are understood with reference to the reproductive right to 
health within pre-existing jurisprudence on reproductive rights within 
India and  Puttaswamy . Despite these similarities, Puttaswamy  explored 
the right to privacy with reference to the Adhaar card’s constitutionality. 
If the new constitutional right to privacy is used in an effort to expand the 
MTPA’s provisions a more nuanced consideration of the cultural and 
economic realities that exist within India which affect women’s access to 
reproductive healthcare will have to be explored before reframing India’s 
obligations to fulfil women’s constitutional rights.  
An examination of existing jurisprudence and academic debates 
suggests that improvements to India’s healthcare infrastructure to 
improve women’s access to reproductive healthcare services would fulfil 
women’s right to privacy and liberty. Existing jurisprudence also suggests 
that any attempt to secure access to sex-determination, or to prevent 
abortion when a foetus is likely to be born disabled, using the new 
constitutional right to privacy would not succeed, due to co-existing 
constitutional and public policy interests. What is certain is that a revised 
rights-based legal framework to reproductive rights that focuses on 
combining rights with the State’s positive duties is likely to emerge in this 
new ‘post-Puttaswamy’ world. 
 
 
 
